We propose a model that solves the crucial disconnect between business cycle models that treat default risk as an exogenous interest rate on working capital, and sovereign default models that treat output ‡uctuations as an exogenous process with ad-hoc default costs. The model explains observed output dynamics around defaults, countercyclical spreads, high debt ratios, and key business cycle moments. Three features of the model are central for these results: working capital loans pay for imported inputs; default triggers an e¢ ciency loss as imported inputs are replaced by imperfect domestic substitutes; and default on public and private foreign obligations occurs simultaneously.
Introduction
Three key empirical regularities characterize the relationship between sovereign debt and economic activity in emerging economies:
(1) Output displays V-shaped dynamics around defaults. Arellano (2008) reports that in recent default episodes GDP deviations from trend were -14 percent in Argentina, - Explanations of these stylized facts proposed in the International Macroeconomics literature su¤er from a crucial disconnect between two important research programs: On one hand, quantitative models of business cycles in emerging economies explain countercyclical country interest rates by modeling the interest rate on sovereign debt as an exogenous interest rate that applies to foreign working capital loans obtained by …rms. 2 In these models, default is exogenous and hence facts (1) and (3) are left unexplained. On the other hand, quantitative models of sovereign default based on the classic setup of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) generate countercyclical sovereign spreads by assuming that a sovereign borrower faces stochastic shocks to an exogenous output endowment with ad-hoc output costs of default. 3 Since output is exogenous, these models cannot address fact (1) and they tend to do poorly 1 Neumeyer and Perri used data for Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and the Philippines. Uribe and Yue added Ecuador, Peru and South Africa, but excluded Korea. 2 See Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006) and Oviedo (2005) . 3 See, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) , Arellano (2008) , Bai and Zhang (2005) and Yue (2010) .
at explaining fact (3) . In short, business cycle models of emerging economies cannot explain the default risk premia that drive their …ndings, and sovereign default models cannot explain the cyclical output dynamics that are critical for their results.
This paper o¤ers a solution to the disconnect between country risk and business cycle theories by proposing a model of sovereign default with endogenous output ‡uctuations. The model features a transmission mechanism that links endogenous default risk with private economic activity via the …nancing cost of working capital used to pay for imported inputs.
Imported inputs can be replaced with domestic inputs but these are imperfect substitutes in a standard Armington, or CES, aggregator, so that default causes an endogenous e¢ ciency loss in production of …nal goods.
The contribution of this framework is that it provides a setup in which the equilibrium dynamics of output and default risk are determined jointly, and in ‡uence each other via the interaction between foreign lenders, the domestic sovereign borrower, domestic …rms, and households. In particular, a fall in productivity increases the likelihood of default and hence sovereign spreads, and this in turn increases the …rms'…nancing costs causing an e¢ ciency loss that ampli…es the negative e¤ects of productivity shocks on output. This in turn feeds back into default incentives and sovereign spreads.
Quantitative analysis shows that the model can explain the three key stylized facts of sovereign debt. Moreover, the …nancial ampli…cation mechanism ampli…es the e¤ect of TFP shocks on output by 80 percent when the economy defaults, and the model matches salient features of emerging markets business cycles such as the high variability of consumption, the countercyclical dynamics of net exports, and the correlation between output and default events.
These results hinge on three important features of the model: First, the assumption that producers of …nal goods obtain working capital loans from abroad to …nance imports of intermediate goods. Second, the e¢ ciency loss in …nal goods production that occurs when the country defaults, because of the loss of access to imported inputs for which domestic inputs are imperfect substitutes. Third, the assumption that the government can divert the private …rms'repayment when it defaults on its own debt.
Existing empirical evidence is in line with the above features of our model. Amiti and Kronings (2007) and Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2008) provide …rm-level evidence of the imperfect substitutability between foreign and domestic inputs, and the associated TFP e¤ect of changes in relative factor costs. In particular, they study the impact of reducing imported input tari¤s on …rm-level productivity using data for Indonesia and Hungary, respectively, and …nd that imperfect substitution of inputs accounts for the majority of e¤ect of the tari¤ cuts on TFP. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) and Reinhart (2010) show that there is a very tight connection between banking crises, with widespread defaults in the non…nancial private sector, and sovereign defaults, and that private debts do become public debt after sovereign defaults.
The model's …nancial transmission mechanism operates as follows: Final goods producers use labor and an Armington aggregator of imported and domestic inputs as factors of production, with the two inputs as imperfect substitutes. A fraction of the cost of imported inputs is paid in advance using foreign working capital loans, while domestic inputs require domestic labor to be produced. Under these assumptions, the optimal input mix depends on the country interest rate (inclusive of default risk), which is also the …nancing cost of working capital, and on TFP. When the country has access to world …nancial markets, …nal goods producers use both imported and domestic inputs, and ‡uctuations in default risk a¤ect the cost of working capital and thus induce "regular" ‡uctuations in factor demands and output.
In contrast, when the country defaults, …nal goods producers switch to use domestic inputs only, because of the surge in the …nancing cost of imported inputs. This reduces production e¢ ciency sharply because domestic inputs are imperfect substitutes for foreign inputs, and because in order to increase the supply of the former labor reallocates away from …nal goods production.
When the economy defaults, both the government and …rms are excluded from world credit markets for some time, with an exogenous probability of re-entry as is common in quantitative studies of sovereign default. Since the probability of default depends on whether the sovereign's value of default is higher than that of repayment, there is feedback between the economic ‡uctuations induced by changes in default probabilities and country risk premia. In particular, rising country risk in the periods leading to a default causes a decline in economic activity as the …rms' …nancing costs increase. In turn, the expectation of lower output at higher levels of country risk alters repayment incentives for the sovereign, a¤ecting the equilibrium determination of default risk premia.
A central feature of our model is that the e¢ ciency loss caused by sovereign default generates an endogenous output cost that is an increasing, strictly convex function of TFP.
This di¤ers sharply from the approaches followed to model output costs of default in the literature. In the literature, these costs are ad-hoc and modeled in one of two forms: First, as a …xed percent of output invariant to the realization of an exogenous endowment when a country defaults (see Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2010) for example). In this case, default is not too costly in a low endowment state relative to a high state, and hence average debt ratios are low when the models are calibrated to actual default frequencies. Second, the asymmetric formulation proposed by Arellano (2008) . In this case, the percent output cost of default increases linearly if a defaulting country's endowment is higher than a certain threshold level, otherwise the percent output cost of default is zero. This asymmetric cost makes default more costly in good states, and thus yields higher debt ratios. However, the debt ratios in the calibrated models are still much lower than in the data, unless features like multiple maturities, dynamic renegotiation or political uncertainty are added. 4 In contrast to the ad-hoc default costs typical in the default literature, the increasing, convex default cost of our model is a general equilibrium outcome driven by the e¤ects of sovereign risk on private markets. This endogenous cost adds "state contingency" to the default option, allowing the model to support higher mean debt ratios at observed default frequencies. Our baseline calibration supports a mean debt-output ratio of about 24 percent, which is four times larger than in Arellano (2008) . In addition, in our model outputs costs of default are always incurred at equilibrium, whereas with Arellano's asymmetric cost defaults tend to occur with the endowment lower than the threshold value, so output costs of default are zero at equilibrium. Moreover, in our setup, output itself falls sharply when the economy defaults, because the model's …nancial transmission mechanism ampli…es the e¤ects of TFP shocks on output. In contrast, in existing sovereign default models, large output drops can only result form large, exogenous endowment shocks.
The model requires foreign and domestic inputs to be imperfect substitutes in order to produce a default cost with the properties we described. 5 The cost is higher and becomes a steeper function of TFP at lower Armington elasticities of substitution, because foreign and domestic inputs are less similar. The elasticity of labor supply also in ‡uences the output cost of default. In particular, the cost is larger the higher this elasticity, because default triggers a reduction in total labor usage. However, output costs of default, and the e¢ ciency loss that drives them, are still present even if labor supply is inelastic. Final goods producers still have to shift from imported to domestic inputs, and labor still reallocates from …nal goods to intermediate goods production.
Since the sharp endogenous output drop that occurs in the model when the economy defaults re ‡ects an e¢ ciency loss, part of this output collapse shows as a fall in the Solow residual (i.e. the fraction of aggregate GDP not accounted for by capital and labor). This is consistent with the data from emerging markets crises showing that a large fraction of the observed output collapse is attributed to the Solow residual (Meza and Quintin (2006) , Mendoza (2010) ). Moreover, Benjamin and Meza (2007) show that in Korea's 1997 crisis, the productivity drop followed in part from a sectoral reallocation of labor.
The treatment of the …nancing cost of working capital in this paper di¤ers from the treatment in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) , who treat this cost as 4 Arellano (2008) obtained a mean debt-output ratio of 6 percent using her asymmetric cost. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) obtained a mean debt ratio of 19 percent using the …xed percent cost, but at a default frequency of only 0.23 percent. Yue (2010) used the same cost in a model with renegotiation calibrated to observed default frequencies, and obtained a mean debt ratio of 9.7 percent. Studies that have obtained higher debt ratios with modi…cations of the Eaton-Gersovitz environment, but still assuming exogenous endowments, include: Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), D'Erasmo (2008), Bi (2008a) and (2008b), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2008) , Benjamin and Wright (2008) , and Lizarazo (2005) . 5 If the inputs are perfect substitutes there is no output cost of default, because …rms can shift inputs without a¤ecting production and costs. If they are complements, production is either zero (with unitary elasticity of substitution) or not de…ned (with less-than-unitary elasticity) when the economy defaults and cannot access imported inputs.
an exogenous variable calibrated to match the interest rate on sovereign debt. In contrast, in our setup both interest rates are driven by endogenous sovereign risk. In addition, in the Neumeyer-Perri and Uribe-Yue models, working capital loans pay the wages bill in full, while in our model …rms use working capital to pay only for a small fraction of imported intermediate goods (about 1/10 in the benchmark calibration). This lower working capital requirement is desirable because, at standard labor income shares, working capital loans would need to be about 2/3rds of GDP to cover the wages bill, and this is di¢ cult to reconcile with observed ratios of total bank credit to the private sector as a share of output in emerging economies, which hover around 50 percent (including all credit to households and …rms at all maturities).
Our analysis is also related to the literature documenting explicit and implicit sanctions on trade ‡ows and trade credit in response to sovereign defaults. Both are relevant for our analysis because the implications of our model are identical whether default triggers exclusion from trade credit or trade sanctions a¤ecting imports of intermediate goods. Kaletsky (1985) argued that exclusion from trade credit might be the heaviest penalty that a defaulter faces.
He documented the exclusion from trade credit experienced by the countries that defaulted in the 1980s, and showed estimates of short-term private credit nearly as large as unpaid interest in medium-term sovereign debt. More recently, Kohlscheen and O'Connell (2008) showed evidence of sharp declines in trade credit from commercial banks during default episodes. Rose (2005) conducted a cross-country analysis of trade ‡ows and default, and found that default has a large, persistent negative e¤ect on bilateral trade between creditor and debtor countries, and Martinez and Sandleris (2008) provided further empirical evidence on the association between sovereign defaults and the decline in trade.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 examines the e¤ects of interest rate changes on production and factor allocations in partial equilibrium. Section 4 explores the full model's quantitative implications for a benchmark calibration. Section 5 conducts sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
A Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles
We study a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of sovereign default and business cycles. There are four groups of agents in the model, three in the "domestic" small open economy (households, …rms, and the sovereign government) and one abroad (foreign lenders).
There are also two sets of producers in the domestic economy: a sector f of …nal goods producers and a sector m of intermediate goods producers.
Households
Households choose consumption and labor supply so as to maximize a standard time-separable utility function E P 1 t=0 t u (c t g(L t )) ; where 0 < < 1 is the discount factor, and c t and L t denote consumption and labor supplied in period t respectively. u( ) is the period utility function, which is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satis…es the Inada conditions. Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988), we remove the wealth e¤ect on labor supply by specifying period utility as a function of consumption net of the disutility of labor g(L t ), where g( ) is increasing, continuously di¤erentiable and convex. This formulation of preferences plays an important role in allowing international real business cycle models to explain observed business cycle facts, and it also simpli…es the "supply side"of the model.
Households take as given the wage rate w t , pro…ts paid by …rms in the f and m sectors f t ; m t and government transfers (T t ). Households do not borrow directly from abroad, but the government borrows, pays transfers, and makes default decisions internalizing their utility function. 6 Consequently, the households'optimization problem reduces to the following static problem:
The optimality condition for labor supply is:
For purposes of the quantitative analysis, we de…ne the labor disutility function in isoe-
Hence, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply will be given by 1=(! 1). The period utility function takes the standard constant-relative-risk-aversion
Final Goods Producers
Firms in the f sector use two variable factors, labor L f t and intermediate goods M t , and a time-invariant capital stock k. 7 They face Markov TFP shocks " t ; with the transition probability distribution function (" t j" t 1 ). The production function is Cobb-Douglas: 6 This assumption is very common in the Eaton-Gersovitz class of models but it is not innocuous, because whether private foreign debt contracts are allowed, and whether they are enforceable vis-a-vis government external debt, a¤ects the e¢ ciency of the credit market equilibrium (see Wright (2006) ). 7 Sovereign debt models generally abstract from capital accumulation for simplicity. Adding capital makes the recursive contract with default option signi…cantly harder to solve because it adds an additional endogenous state variable. Moreover, changes in the capital stock have been estimated to play a small role in output dynamics around …nancial crises (see Meza and Quintin (2006) and Mendoza (2007) ).
The mix of intermediate goods used in the production of …nal goods is determined by a standard Armington aggregator of imported inputs m t and inputs produced at home m d t :
The elasticity of substitution between m t and m d t is equal to j1=( 1)j and is the Armington weight of domestic inputs. The typical parameter restrictions on the Armington aggregator are 1 1, 0 1. In our model, however, we will show later that 0 < < 1 is necessary in order to support equilibria in which y t at default is well de…ned and the output cost of default increases with ".
Imported inputs are sold in a competitive world market at the exogenous price p m relative to the …nal good, which is used as numeraire. 8 A fraction of the cost of these inputs needs to be paid in advance using working capital loans t . These are intraperiod loans repaid at the end of the period that are o¤ered by foreign creditors at the interest rate r t . This interest rate is linked to the sovereign interest rate at equilibrium, as shown in the next section.
Working capital loans satisfy the standard payment-in-advance condition: 9
Pro…t-maximizing producers of …nal goods choose t so that this condition holds with equality.
Domestic inputs do not require working capital …nancing, but this assumption is just for simplicity, the key element for the analysis is that at high levels of country risk (including periods without access to foreign credit markets) the …nancing cost of foreign inputs is higher than that of domestic inputs.
The optimization problem of …nal goods producers can be expressed using a static payo¤, so that these producers choose factor demands in order to maximize date-t pro…ts taking w t , r t , p m , and p m t (the endogenous price of domestic inputs relative to …nal goods) as given. Date-t Pro…ts are:
We can simplify the problem in this way because working capital is modeled as an intra-period The …rst-order conditions of the optimization problem of …nal goods producers are:
Intermediate Goods Producers
Producers in the m sector use labor L m t and operate with a production function given by A(L m t ) , with 0 1 and A > 0. A represents both the role of a …xed factor and an invariant state of TFP in the m sector: Given p m t and w t , the pro…t maximization problem of intermediate goods …rms is:
Their optimal labor demand satis…es this standard condition:
Competitive Equilibrium of the Private Sector
De…nition 1 A competitive equilibrium for the private sector of the economy is given by sequences of allocations
A key constraint on the problem of the sovereign borrower making the default decision will be that private-sector allocations must be a competitive equilibrium. Since the government's problem and the equilibrium of the credit market will be characterized in recursive form as functions de…ned in the state space domain, it is useful to also characterize the above competitive equilibrium in terms of functions of state variables, and to distinguish private sector allocations in states in which the economy has credit market access from those in which it does not.
If sector f has access to credit markets, the private sector equilibrium can be represented by the set of functions m (r; "); m d (r; "); L f (r; "); L m (r; "); L(r; "); p m (r; "); w(r; "); (r; ") that solve the following nonlinear system of equations for a given pair (r; ") :
During periods of exclusion from world credit markets, the private competitive equilibrium is the limiting case of the above nonlinear system as r ! 1. Since sector f does not have access to foreign working capital …nancing, it uses only domestic inputs. Assuming 0 < < 1, the nonlinear system has the following closed-form solutions expressed as functions of ":
where
Conditions (13)- (25) are crucial because they drive the e¤ects of ‡uctuations in TFP and interest rates on production and factor allocations before, during, and after default episodes.
We study these e¤ects in detail in Section 3.
Using conditions (13)- (25), it is also straightforward to explain why foreign and domestic inputs need to be imperfect substitutes (i.e. 0 < < 1). If = 1, there is no output cost of default because the two inputs are perfect substitutes, and hence there is no e¢ ciency loss in changing one input for the other. If 0; the two inputs are complements and there are two outcomes: If = 0 (the unitary elasticity case), default implies m t = 0 and y t = 0, and the output cost of default is 100 percent for any value of " t . If < 0, strict complementarity implies that with m t = 0 the value of y t is unde…ned.
Given sectoral production and factor allocations, we apply standard National Accounts de…nitions to compute GDP as gross production of …nal goods minus the cost of imported inputs at constant prices, gdp t y t p m (1 + r t )m t . 10 Using the optimality conditions of the f and m sectors, we can rewrite GDP as gdp
. The …rst and second terms in the right-hand-side of this expression represent value added in the f and m sectors respectively. Note that given the CES formulation of M t , the …rms'
Thus, the cost of imported inputs valued at constant prices equals the fraction M of …nal goods production minus the cost of domestic inputs, but with the latter valued at their equilibrium time-varying price.
The Sovereign Government
The sovereign government trades with foreign lenders one-period, zero-coupon discount bonds, so markets of contingent claims are incomplete. The face value of these bonds speci…es the amount to be repaid next period, b t+1 . When the country purchases bonds b t+1 > 0, and when it borrows b t+1 < 0. The set of bond face values is B = [b min ; b max ] R, where
We set the lower bound b min > y r , which is the largest debt that the country could repay with full commitment. The upper bound b max is the highest level of assets that the country may accumulate. 11 The sovereign cannot commit to repay its debt. As in the Eaton-Gersovitz model, we assume that when the country defaults it does not repay at date t and the punishment is exclusion from the world credit market in the same period. The country re-enters the credit market with an exogenous probability , and when it does it starts with a fresh record and zero debt. 12 Also as in the Eaton-Gersovitz setup, the country cannot hold positive international assets during the exclusion period, otherwise the model cannot support equilibria with debt.
We add to the Eaton-Gersovitz setup an explicit link between default risk and private …nancing costs. This is done by assuming that a defaulting sovereign can divert the repayment of the …rms' working capital loans to foreign lenders. Hence, both …rms and government default together. As explained in the introduction, this is very much in line with the historical evidence documented by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) and Reinhart (2010) . We also provide empirical evidence later in this Section showing the tight link between private and public borrowing costs.
The sovereign government solves a problem akin to a Ramsey problem. 13 It chooses a debt policy (amounts and default or repayment) that maximizes the households' welfare subject to the constraints that: (a) the private sector allocations must be a competitive equilibrium; and (b) the government budget constraint must hold. The state variables are the bond position, working capital loans as of the end of last period, and the state of TFP, denoted by the triplet (b t ; t 1 ; " t ). The price of sovereign bonds is given by the bond pricing function q t (b t+1 ; " t ). Since at equilibrium the default risk premium on sovereign debt will be the same as on working capital loans, it follows that the interest rate on working capital is a function of q t (b t+1 ; " t ). Hence, the recursive functions that represent the competitive equilibrium of the private sector when the economy has access to world credit markets can be re-
The recursive optimization problem of the government is summarized by the following value function:
If the country has access to the world credit market at date t, the value function is the maximum of the value of continuing in the credit relationship with foreign lenders (i.e., "no default"), v nd (b t ; " t ), and the value of default, v d ( t 1; " t ). If b t 0, the value function is simply v nd (b t ; " t ) because in this case the economy uses the credit market to save, receiving a return equal to the world's risk free rate r .
The continuation value is de…ned as follows:
subject to
The constraint of this problem is the resource constraint of the economy at a competitive equilibrium. The left-hand-side is the sum of consumption and net exports, and the right-hand-side is GDP. This constraint is obtained by combining the households' budget constraint (2) with the government budget constraint,
The resource constraint (28) captures three important features of the model: First, the government internalizes how interest rates and working capital a¤ect the competitive equilibrium allocations of output and factor demands. Second, the government also internalizes the households'desire to smooth consumption, and hence transfers to them an amount equal to the negative of the balance of trade (i.e. the ‡ow of resources private agents need to …nance the gap between GDP and consumption). Third, the working capital loans t 1 and t do not enter explicitly in the continuation value or in the resource constraint but they are relevant state variables, because the amount of working capital loans taken by …nal goods producers at date t a¤ects the sovereign's incentive to default at t + 1; as explained below.
The value of default is:
; (29) subject to:
Note that v d ( t 1 ; " t ) takes into account the fact that in case of default at date t; the country has no access to …nancial markets this period, and hence the country consumes the total income given by the resource constraint in the default scenario. In this case, since …rms cannot borrow to …nance purchases of imported inputs,m ("),L(") andL f (") are competitive equilibrium allocations that correspond to the case when the f sector operates with domestic inputs only (in this case, M = 1 m (")). Moreover, because the defaulting government diverts the repayment of last period's working capital loans, total household income includes government transfers equal to the appropriated repayment t 1 (i.e., on the date of default, the government budget constraint is T t = t 1 ). The value of default at t also takes into account that at t + 1 the economy may re-enter world capital markets with probability and associated value V (0; 0; " t+1 ), or remain in …nancial autarky with probability 1 and
For a debt position b t < 0 and given a level of working capital t 1 , default is optimal for the set of realizations of " t for which v d ( t 1 ; " t ) is at least as high as v nd (b t ; " t ):
It is critical to note that this default set has a di¤erent speci…cation than in the typical Eaton-Gersovitz model (see Arellano (2008) ), because the state of working capital a¤ects the gap between the values of default and repayment. This results in a two-dimensional default set that depends on b t and t 1 , instead of just b t :
Despite the fact that the default set depends on t 1 , the probability of default remains a function of b t+1 and " t only. This is because the f sector's optimality conditions imply that the next period's working capital loan t depends on " t and the interest rate, which is a function of b t+1 and " t . Thus the probability of default at t + 1 perceived as of date t for a country with a productivity " t and debt b t+1 , p t (b t+1 ; " t ), can be induced from the default set, the decision rule for working capital, and the transition probability function of productivity shocks (" t+1 j" t ) as follows:
The economy is considered to be in …nancial autarky when it has been in default for at least one period and remains without access to world credit markets as of date t:The optimization problem of the sovereign is the same as the problem in the default period but evaluated at t 1 = 0 (i.e. v d (" t ; 0)). This is the case because we assume that while in …nancial autarky the economy cannot build up its own stock of savings to supply working capital loans to …rms, which could be used to purchase imported inputs. Alternatively, we can assume that the default punishment includes exclusion from both world capital markets and the world market of intermediate goods. Kaletsky (1985) argues that trade sanctions do play a role in actual default events.
The model preserves a standard feature of the Eaton-Gersovitz model: Given " t , the value of defaulting is independent of the level of debt, while the value of not defaulting increases with b t+1 , and consequently the default set and the equilibrium default probability grow with the country's debt. The following theorem formalizes this result:
Theorem 1 Given a productivity shock " and level of working capital loan , for
The country agent's probability of default in equilibrium satis…es p b 0 ; " p b 1 ; " .
Proof. See Appendix.
Foreign Lenders
International creditors are risk-neutral and have complete information. They invest in sovereign bonds and in private working capital loans. Foreign lenders behave competitively and face an opportunity cost of funds equal to the world risk-free interest rate. Competition implies that they expect zero pro…ts at equilibrium, and that the returns on sovereign debt and the world's risk-free asset are fully arbitraged:
This condition implies that at equilibrium bond prices depend on the risk of default. For a high level of debt, the default probability is higher. Therefore, equilibrium bond prices decrease with indebtedness. This result, formalized in Theorem 2 below, is again in line with the Eaton-Gersovitz model and is also consistent with the empirical evidence documented by Edwards (1984) .
Theorem 2 Given a productivity shock " and level of working capital loan , for b 0 < b 1 0, the equilibrium bond price satis…es q b 0 ; " q b 1 ; " :
Proof. See Appendix. The returns on sovereign bonds and working capital loans are also fully arbitraged. Because the sovereign government diverts the repayment of working capital loans when it defaults, foreign lenders assign the same risk of default to private working capital loans as to sovereign debt, and hence the no-arbitrage condition between sovereign lending and working capital loans implies:
This arbitrage result raises a key empirical question: Are the interest rates faced by sovereign governments and private …rms in emerging economies closely related?
Answering this question in full is beyond the scope of this paper, but we do provide evidence suggesting that corporate and sovereign interest rates tend to move together. To study this issue, we constructed a measure of …rm-level e¤ective interest rates as the ratio of a …rm's total debt service divided by its total debt obligations using the Worldscope database. We then constructed country aggregates by computing the median across …rms. Table 1 reports these estimates of corporate interest rates together with the standard EMBI+ measure of interest rates on sovereign debt and the correlations between the two. Table 1 shows that the two interest rates are positively correlated in most countries, with a median correlation of 0.7, and in some countries the relationship is very strong (see Figure   1 ). 14 The table also shows that the e¤ective …nancing cost of …rms is generally higher than the sovereign interest rates. This fact indicates that the common conjecture that …rms (particularly the large corporations covered in our data) may pay lower rates than governments with default risk is incorrect.
There is also strong historical evidence in favor of the assumption driving the arbitrage of private and government interest rates in the model, namely that the government diverts the repayment of the …rms'foreign obligations. As noted earlier, this is documented in the comprehensive studies by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) and Reinhart (2010) . In particular, it is common for governments to take over the foreign obligations of the corporate sector in actual default episodes, particularly when a domestic banking crisis precedes sovereign default, which is a common occurrence. 15 positive relationship between private domestic lending rates and sovereign spreads. 
Recursive equilibrium
De…nition 2 The model's recursive equilibrium is given by (i) a decision rule b t+1 (b t ; t 1 ; " t ) for the sovereign government with associated value function V (b t ; t 1 ; " t ), consumption and transfers rules c (b t ; t 1 ; " t ) and T (b t ; t 1 ; " t ) ; default set D (b t ; t 1 ) and default probabilities p (b t+1 ; " t ); and (ii) an equilibrium pricing function for sovereign bonds q (b t+1 ; " t ) such that:
1. Given q (b t+1 ; " t ), the decision rule b t+1 (b t ; t 1 ; " t ) solves the recursive maximization problem of the sovereign government (26).
2. The consumption plan c (b t ; t 1 ; " t ) satis…es the resource constraint of the economy 3. The transfers policy T (b t ; t 1 ; " t ) satis…es the government budget constraint.
4. Given D (b t ; t 1 ) and p (b t+1 ; " t ) ; the bond pricing function q (b t+1 ; " t ) satis…es the arbitrage condition of foreign lenders (33) .
Condition 1 requires that the sovereign government's default and saving/borrowing decisions be optimal given the interest rates on sovereign debt. Condition 2 requires that the private consumption allocations implied by these optimal borrowing and default choices be both feasible and consistent with a competitive equilibrium (recall that the resource constraint of the sovereign's optimization problem considers only private-sector allocations that are competitive equilibria). Condition 3 requires that the decision rule for government transfers shifts the appropriate amount of resources between the government and the private sector (i.e. an amount equivalent to net exports when the country has access to world credit markets, or the diverted repayment of working capital loans when a default occurs, or zero when the economy is in …nancial autarky beyond the date of default). Notice also that given conditions 2 and 3, the consumption plan satis…es the households' budget constraint. Finally, Condition 4 requires the equilibrium bond prices that determine country risk premia to be consistent with optimal lender behavior.
A solution to the above recursive equilibrium includes solutions for the private sector equilibrium allocations with and without credit market access. A solution for equilibrium interest rates on working capital as a function of b t+1 and " t follows from (34) . Expressions for equilibrium wages, pro…ts and the price of domestic inputs as functions of r t and " t follow then from the …rms'optimality conditions and the de…nitions of pro…ts described earlier.
Country Risk and Default Costs in Partial Equilibrium

Interest Rate Changes and Factor Allocations
The e¤ects of interest rate changes on the factor allocations of the private competitive equilibrium play a central role in our model because they are a key determinant of both output dynamics and the output cost of default. We illustrate these e¤ects by means of a partialequilibrium numerical example in which the interest rates is exogenous. We use the parameter values set in the calibration exercise of Section 4, and solve for private sector factor allocations and prices using conditions (13)- (20) with di¤erent values of r. 
production by inducing a shift from foreign to domestic inputs, and by reallocating a given total endowment of labor supply from production of …nal goods to production of intermediate goods.
Output costs of default
Using the same numerical example, we can now examine how the output cost of default varies with "; and how this relationship depends on and !. increasing and strictly convex in ". This is the case because, with Cobb-Douglas production technologies and competitive markets, the negative e¤ect of increases in marginal costs on factor demands is larger at higher TFP levels. 17 Second, the cost of default is a steeper function of " at lower, but higher-than-unitary, Armington elasticities. 18 This is an implication of the previous results showing that the negative e¤ects of interest rate shocks on factor allocations are larger when domestic inputs are poorer substitutes of imported inputs. 1 7 This is the case in turn because of the "strong" convexity of Cobb-Douglas marginal products. Consider for simplicity the case in which production "F (m) requires a single input m. In this case, "strong convexity" means that F (m) satis…es F 000 (m) > (F 00 (m)) 2 =F 0 (m), which holds in the Cobb-Douglas case. 1 8 Elasticities higher than unitary are necessary for this result because, as ! 0 and the Armington elasticity approaches 1, output in the default scenario vanishes, and thus the cost of default converges to 100 percent and becomes independent of the level of TFP. The fact that the output cost of default increases with " implies that default is more painful at higher TFP levels. This result plays a key role in enabling the model to support high debt levels at the observed default frequencies, and producing defaults in "bad" times, because it makes default more attractive at lower states of productivity. In this way, default works as a desirable implicit hedging mechanism given the incompleteness of asset markets. The labor market equilibrium illustrated in Figure 5 provides the intuition behind the result that higher labor supply elasticity produces larger output costs of default. For simplicity, we plot labor demands and supply as linear functions. The labor demand functions are given by the marginal products in the left-hand-side of (10) and (12) , and the labor supply is given by the marginal disutility of labor in the left-hand-side of (3). Since labor is homogenous across sectors, total labor demand is just the sum of the sectoral labor demands. The initial labor market equilibrium is at point A with wage w , total labor L and sectoral allocations L m and L f .
Output Costs of Default as a
Consider now a positive interest rate shock. This leads to a reduction in labor demand in …nal goods from L D f toL D f . This occurs because, as explained earlier, higher r causes a reduction in M and the marginal product of L f is a negative function of M (since the production function of …nal goods is Cobb-Douglas). As a result, total labor demand shifts from L D to e L D . 20 The new labor market equilibrium is at point e A. The wage rate, the total labor allocation, and the labor allocated to …nal goods are lower than before, while labor allocated to production of domestic inputs rises (assuming that foreign and domestic inputs are gross substitutes).
Consider now how the results shown in Figure 5 would change if labor is in…nitely elastic.
In this case, L s is an horizontal line at the level of w and the interest rate hike leaves w unchanged instead of reducing it. As a result, L falls more, L m is unchanged instead of rising, and L f falls less. 21 Hence, the adverse e¤ect on output is stronger. Going to the other extreme, if labor is inelastic, L s is a vertical line at the level of L . Now L cannot change, but w falls more than in the scenario plotted in Figure 5 , L m rises more, and L f falls more.
Hence, the decline in output is smaller.
Quantitative analysis 4.1 Calibration
We study the quantitative implications of the model by conducting numerical simulations setting the model to a quarterly frequency and using a benchmark calibration based mostly on data for Argentina, as is typically done in the related literature on quantitative studies of sovereign default. Table 2 shows the parameter values of this benchmark calibration.
The risk aversion parameter is set to 2 and the quarterly world risk-free interest rate r is set to 1 percent, which are standard values in quantitative business cycle and sovereign default studies. The curvature of labor disutility in the utility function is set to ! = 1:455, which implies a Frisch wage elasticity of labor supply of 1=(! 1) = 2:2. This is the value 2 0 In Figure 5 , we hold constant pm for simplicity. At equilibrium, the relative price of domestic inputs changes, and this alters the value of the marginal product of Ld, and hence labor demand by the m sector. The results of the numerical example do take this into account and still are roughly in line with the intuition derived from Figure 5 . Productivity shocks in …nal goods production follow an AR(1) process:
with t iid N 0; 2 . We use a Markov approximation to this process with 25 realizations constructed using the method proposed by Tauchen (1986). Data limitations prevent us from estimating (35) directly using actual TFP data, so we set 2 and " (together with other parameters discussed below) using the simulated method of moments (SMM) set to target a set of moment conditions from the data. The target moment conditions for 2
and " are Argentina's standard deviation and …rst-order autocorrelation of quarterly H-P detrended GDP. We use seasonally-adjusted quarterly real GDP from the Ministry of Finance The additional parameters calibrated using SMM are , , A, , and . These parameters are targeted to match the average nominal and real expenditure ratios of imported to domestic inputs, the fraction of output loss at default, the frequency of default, and the volatility of the trade balance-GDP ratio. 24 Serious limitations of the national accounts data for Argentina prevent us from computing target expenditure ratios of imported v. domestic inputs, so we compute them instead using Mexican data for the period 1988-2004. The average ratios of imported to domestic inputs at current and constant prices are 18 and 15.7 percent respectively. We assume that Argentina has similar ratios. 25 The default frequency is 0.69 percent because Argentina has defaulted …ve times on its external debt since 1824 (the average default frequency is 2.78 percent annually or 0.69 percent quarterly). The output loss at default is set to 13 percent. This corresponds to the deviation from the H-P trend in Argentina's quarterly GDP as of the …rst quarter of 2002. 26 The standard deviation of Argentina's quarterly trade balance-to-GDP ratio is 2.88 percent. (8) and (9)), and we obtained estimates of = 0:66 and = 0:62, both statistically signi…cant (with standard errors of 0.11 and 0.12 respectively).
The calibrated Armington elasticity of substitution of 3.23 is in the range of existing empirical estimates, but these estimates vary widely. McDaniel and Balistreri (2002) review the literature and quote estimates ranging from 0.14 to 6.9. They explain that elasticities tend to be higher when estimated with disaggregated data, in cross-sectional instead of time-series samples, or when using long-run instead of short-run tests.
The subjective discount factor is 0.87, which is in the range of the values used in existing studies on sovereign default. 27 The estimate for A is 0.2. Finally, the estimate for implies that …rms pay only 1/10 of the cost of imported inputs in advance.
In the subsections that follow we examine di¤erent aspects of the model's numerical solution based on this benchmark calibration. In order to obtain solutions that apply to the model's stochastic stationary state, we feed the TFP process to the model and conduct 2000 simulations, each with 500 periods and truncating the …rst 100 observations.
Cyclical Co-movements in the Benchmark Simulation
This subsection examines the ability of the benchmark model to account for the observed statistical moments of business cycles and sovereign debt. Table 3 Table 3 shows that the model yields a negative correlation between spreads and GDP, and this is because sovereign bonds have higher default risk in bad states. As we noted in the Introduction, both quantitative models of sovereign debt and of business cycles in emerging economies also produce countercyclical spreads, but in the former output is an exogenous stochastic endowment and in the latter country risk is exogenous. In contrast, our model produces countercyclical country risk in a setting in which both output and country risk are endogenous, and in ‡uence each other because of the "credit channel" linking country risk, the cost of working capital, and the private sector equilibrium. The model is also consistent with two key stylized facts of emerging markets business cycles: countercyclical net exports and consumption variability that exceeds output variability. The …rst result follows from the fact that, when the country is in a bad TFP state, it faces higher interest rates and tends to borrow less. The country's trade balance thus increases because of the lower borrowing, leading to a negative correlation between net exports and output. The second result occurs because the ability to use external debt to smooth consumption is negatively a¤ected by the higher interest rates induced by increased default probabilities. The sovereign borrows less when the economy faces an adverse TFP shock, and thus households adjust consumption by more than in the absence of default risk. On the other hand, because agents are impatient, the benevolent government borrows more to increase private consumption when the TFP shock is good. Hence, the variability of consumption rises. As with the countercyclical spreads, existing models of sovereign debt and emerging markets business cycles can produce similar results, but not without assuming that either country risk or output ‡uctuations are exogenous.
The model produces a debt-to-GDP ratio of 23 percent on average. This high debt ratio is mainly the result of the large output drop that occurs when the country defaults, and the increasing output cost of default as a function of TFP. Although a 23 percent debt ratio is still below Argentina's 35 percent average debt-output ratio (based on data from the World Bank's WFD dataset for the 1980-2004 period), it is much larger than the debt ratios typically obtained in quantitative models of sovereign default with exogenous output costs already targeted to improve the models'quantitative performance. For instance, Yue's (2010) model with renegotiation and an exogenous two-percent proportional output cost of default yields an average debt ratio of 9.7 percent. Arellano (2008) obtains a mean debt ratio of 6 percent of GDP with an asymmetric output cost of default that lowers income when the economy defaults to the maximum of actual output or 97 percent of average output. 28 The model also matches closely the volatility of the Argentine bond spreads observed in the data. Yet the average bond spread is lower than in the data. Because we assume a zero recovery rate on defaulted debt and risk-neutral creditors, bond spreads are linked one-to-one with default probabilities (see eq. (33)). Since the quarterly default frequency is 0.7 percent (as in the data), the model can only generate an average bond spread of a similar magnitude, which is about 1/3 of the average spreads observed in the data. We also report in Table 3 the correlation between defaults and GDP and the fractions of default events that occur when GDP is below trend and two-standard-deviations or more below trend. The data estimates of these moments are Tomz and Wright's (2007) crosscountry historical estimates based on data for the period 1820-2004. Because these are moments based on annual data, we show in the table the comparable annual-equivalent moments from the model. The correlation between defaults and GDP in the model is -0.12, very close to the actual correlation. The model can produce defaults that occur in good times (de…ned as GDP above trend) at the annual frequency, but this happens only with 11 percent of defaults. Hence, 89 percent of defaults occur in "bad times," which is signi…cantly more than in the data. On the other hand, the model is much closer to the data in the fraction of defaults that occur with deep recessions (de…ned as GDP two standard deviations or more below trend). This occurs with 30 percent of defaults in the model v. 24 percent of defaults in the data.
Macroeconomic Dynamics around Default Events
We study the model's ability to match V-shaped output dynamics around default episodes by applying event study techniques to the simulated time series data. Figure 6 which is about the same as the 5 percent average decline in TFP in default events (i.e. at t = 0 in Figure 6 ). This suggests that the model's …nancial transmission mechanism ampli…es signi…cantly the real e¤ects of TFP shocks when these shocks trigger default.
The magnitude of the ampli…cation e¤ect can be quanti…ed by computing the average output drop that the model produces in response to a 5 percent TFP shock when there is no default, and comparing it with the 13 percent mean output drop that the same shock produces when default occurs. Without default, a 5 percent TFP shock produces a mean output drop of about 7.2 percent. Thus, the ampli…cation coe¢ cient due to default is 13=7:2 = 1:8.
Default ampli…es the output e¤ect of TFP shocks by 80 percent.
The V-shaped recovery of output after default is driven by two e¤ects. First, since " is mean-reverting, TFP is likely to improve after default (on average, " rises by 1 percent at t = 1). Therefore, even though the country remains in …nancial autarky on average from dates 1 to 10, the economy recovers because TFP improves. The second e¤ect is the surge in output that occurs when the country re-enters credit markets (as …nal goods producers switch back to a more e¢ cient mix of imported and domestic inputs).
The two e¤ects that induce the post-default recovery are illustrated in Figure 6 by the lines that show the simulated paths of GDP with continued exclusion for 10 quarters after default and with immediate re-entry one period after default. In the …rst scenario, the recovery re ‡ects only the e¤ect of the mean reversion of ". GDP in this case remains below that in the simulation average because the latter is also a¤ected by the probability of credit-market re-entry. In contrast, the second scenario with immediate re-entry to international credit markets shows a big rebound in GDP at t = 1; because of the e¢ ciency gain obtained as …nal goods producers regain access to imported inputs. The simulation average lies below this immediate re-entry line because re-entry to credit markets is stochastic with 12.5 percent probability. Since re-entry has a relatively low probability, the model simulation for average GDP weighs more the e¤ect of TFP recovery than the e¤ect of credit market re-entry.
The model's V-shaped output dynamics are qualitatively consistent with the data of emerging markets that experienced Sudden Stops. Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006) conducted a cross-country empirical analysis of the recovery of emerging economies from Sudden Stops, and found that most recoveries are not associated with improvements in credit market access. In our model as well, recovery occurs (on average) even though the economy continues to be excluded from world credit markets.
The output dynamics also suggest that the model can account for the seemingly dominant role of productivity shocks in output collapses during …nancial crises. In particular, this can be the result of the e¢ ciency loss caused by the change in the mix of intermediate goods and the sectoral reallocation of labor when the economy defaults. To demonstrate this point, we use the model's simulated data to compute Solow residuals in the standard way: We assume an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function for economy-wide GDP, gdp t = s t (L t ) a k 1 a ;
and compute the Solow residual s using the model's data for L and gdp, setting a to the model's average of the ratio of total wage payments to GDP, w t L t =gdp t , which is about 0.7.
By construction, however, the "true" TFP shock driving the model is " t in the production function of …nal goods. however, the current account reversal is modeled as an exogenous shock, whereas in this model both the current account reversal and the economic collapse are endogenous. 30 
Sensitivity Analysis
In this Section we conduct a sensitivity analysis to study how the model's quantitative predictions change when we vary the working capital requirement , the parameters of the Armington aggregator and , and the labor supply curvature parameter !. In reviewing these results, it is important to keep in mind that , and were calibrated using SMM to target statistics from actual data. Hence, the sensitivity analysis helps us explain how the model's results depend on these parameters, but the values of these parameters that best …t the model according to the SMM results are the benchmark values.
Working Capital
Column (I) of (2010)), we introduce here a similar exogenous proportional cost. The cost is set so that TFP falls by as much as needed to produce an output drop of 13 percent, which implies an output drop of the same magnitude as the endogenous drop in our baseline calibration. 31 The other parameters are kept unchanged.
The model without working capital performs much worse than the benchmark in terms of its ability to match the important features of the data that the benchmark model approximated well (Column (II) of Table 4 reproduces the results of the benchmark model). The frequency of defaults falls from 0.6 percent to 0.12 percent. The mean debt ratio collapses to almost zero, and the average and standard deviation of country spreads fall by 46 and 55 basis points respectively. In addition, the GDP correlation of sovereign spreads increases to -0.04, and the correlation between spreads and net exports falls sharply from 0.18 to -0.21. These results follow from two important di¤erences in the model without working capital relative to the benchmark: First, the cost of default becomes independent of TFP, and second, bond spreads no longer have a direct impact on production. As a result, debt is not as good a hedging mechanism as in the benchmark model, making default more painful ex ante in the model without working capital, and thus reducing the average debt ratio. The left-side panel of Figure 10 compares default event windows for GDP in the benchmark model and in the model without working capital. The GDP drop at default is identical in the two cases by construction, since both models are calibrated to obtain the same 13 percent output loss at default. Before the default occurs, however, the two models produce signi…cantly di¤erent dynamics. The benchmark model shows a gradual recession that starts 6 quarters before the default, while the model without working capital produces a sustained boom that peaks just before default hits, which is not in line with the data. This is because the model without working capital lacks an endogenous feedback mechanism from default risk to output, and default is preceded (on average) by positive TFP shocks. The recovery stage is nearly identical in both models, but this is also by construction because both cases are driven by the mean reversion of shocks targeted to produce GDP stochastic processes with identical characteristics. The benchmark model shows slightly higher output because of the possibility (with low probability) of credit-market re-entry, and the surge in output associated with this.
How sensitive are the model's results to the value of the working capital requirement beyond the extreme case of = 0? To answer this question, we report in Column (III) of Table 4 results for = 0:15; instead of 0:1 as in the benchmark case. The higher working capital coe¢ cient reduces the mean debt ratio by 6 percentage points of GDP and generates a smaller output cost of default. In contrast, the variability of GDP, the probability of default, and the mean and standard deviation of spreads all increase sharply. for the sovereign to exercise the default option more often, increasing the default probability and the volatility of bond spreads, and reducing the mean debt/GDP ratio.
The quantitative e¤ects of tightening the working capital constraint on the debt/GDP ratio and on the default frequency are particularly large. Interestingly, we get these results even though average sovereign spreads, and hence the average interest rate on working capital, do not di¤er much from the one-percent risk free rate. In contrast, Neumeyer and Perri and Uribe and Yue obtain the result that working capital is important for emerging markets business cycles using average interest rates around 7 percent and = 1 (applied to the wages The right-side panel of Figure 10 shows the output dynamics around default events for the benchmark model and the model with = 0:15. The model with the higher working capital coe¢ cient still produces V-shaped dynamics around defaults, but with a milder recession before default and a smaller drop in output at default, as explained above.
The distribution of defaults across "bad times" and "good times" also changes with the value of . In particular, the higher shifts the distribution away from the states with larger output drops. At the annual frequency, we …nd that with = 0:15 about 12 percent of the defaults occur with output above trend, and 5 percent of them occur with GDP two standard deviations or more below trend (compared with 30 percent of defaults in the benchmark case). The correlation between GDP and default is about -0.27.
Imperfect Substitution between Foreign and Domestic Inputs
Column (I) of Table 5 All of the other parameters are the same as in the benchmark calibration. Table 5 shows that the values of and a¤ect signi…cantly the magnitude of the output loss at default, as would be expected given the analysis of Section 3. With lower or , imported inputs are "more important" for …nal goods production. This is re ‡ected in the nominal and real expenditure ratios of imported to domestic inputs, which are much higher with lower or lower than in the benchmark case or in the Mexican data used as SMM targets in the calibration. On the other hand, these higher expenditure ratios are in the range of those for the countries included in the study by Goldberg and Campa (2006) , so scenarios like those in Columns (I) and (III) of the Table should not be regarded as implausible.
When the Armington elasticity of substitution is lower, domestic inputs are poorer substitutes for imported inputs, and hence the e¢ ciency loss of the f sector when the economy defaults is bigger. Similarly, if domestic inputs have a lower , default is more painful when access to foreign inputs is lost. Accordingly, the output costs of default in the scenarios with lower and lower reach about 25 and 17 percent respectively, compared with 13 percent in the benchmark. Because of these higher output costs of default, the probabilities of default are lower (0.02 and 0.19 percent respectively) and the mean debt ratios are much higher (169 and 92 percent respectively).
Changes in and also a¤ect business cycle comovements. Lower and lower produce higher output variability. The standard deviations of GDP increase to 4.9 and 5.4 percent respectively, compared with 4.7 in the benchmark. The correlations of GDP with spreads and net exports remain negative, as in the benchmark case, but they are signi…cantly more negative with = 0:5. Figure 11 shows the output dynamics around default episodes for the benchmark case and the cases with = 0:5 and = 0:5. These alternative speci…cations preserve the Vshaped output dynamics. However, the scenario with = 0:5 produces a period of sustained expansion before defaults, instead of the gradual recession in the benchmark case, and a larger collapse in output when default occurs. The case with = 0:5 yields a milder recession before default but again a larger output collapse at the time of default. 
Labor Supply Elasticity
Column (I) of Table 6 presents the results of a simulation rising ! from 1.45 in the benchmark to ! = 2:0; so that the labor supply elasticity falls from 2.2 to 1. As demonstrated in Section 3, a lower labor supply elasticity generates a lower output cost of default, without altering the slope of the relationship between default costs and TFP. Hence, the model with a less elastic labor supply supports less debt. At the same time, however, output variability declines, since labor variability is lower with the lower elasticity. The default probability falls, despite the lower default penalty, because the e¤ects of the lower labor elasticity on default costs and output variability push in opposite directions: The lower output cost tends to increase the default frequency, but the lower output variability tends to reduce it. The bond spreads are lower and less volatile as well. The correlation between GDP and spreads rises, while net exports become more countercyclical. Also, in line with the results shown in Section 3, the expenditure ratios of imported to domestic inputs are not a¤ected by changes in the labor supply elasticity. The output dynamics around default in the scenario with ! = 2 are again qualitatively consistent with the V-shaped pattern of the other scenarios (see Figure 12) . Quantitatively, however, this scenario yields a period with a mild expansion before default, instead of recession, and a smaller output collapse when default takes place.
The change in labor elasticity also a¤ects the distribution of default events across output realizations, but the e¤ects are not as large as those caused by changing the Armington parameters. At annual frequency, the fraction of defaults with output below trend fell from 90 percent in the benchmark to 73 percent with ! = 2 , and the fraction with output two standard deviations below trend fell from 30 to 6 percent. The correlation between output and defaults fell from -0.12 to -0.04.
Conclusions
This paper proposed a model of strategic sovereign default with endogenous output dynamics and examined its quantitative predictions. In the model, producers of …nal goods choose an optimal mix of imported and domestic inputs that are imperfect substitutes. Purchases of foreign inputs require foreign working capital …nancing, and production of domestic inputs requires reallocation of labor away from …nal goods production. In this setup, default causes an e¢ ciency loss by forcing …nal goods producers to operate using only domestic inputs, and inducing labor to reallocate from the …nal goods sector to the sector producing domestic inputs. Lenders charge the same default risk premium on working capital loans as on sovereign debt because the sovereign diverts the repayment of working capital loans when the country defaults. This is in line with empirical evidence showing that corporate and sovereign interest rates are strongly correlated, and that in sovereign defaults since the 1980s Debt Crisis we often observe governments taking over the foreign obligations of private …rms.
The model is consistent with three key stylized facts of sovereign debt: (1) the V-shaped dynamics of output around default events, (2) the negative correlation between interest rates on sovereign debt and output, and (3) the high debt-output ratios on average and when defaults take place. The model also replicates key emerging markets business cycle moments such as the countercyclical dynamics of net exports, the high variability of private consumption, the weakly negative correlation between defaults and GDP, and the correlations of intermediate goods with spreads and GDP.
The model produces an endogenous output cost of default that is increasing in the state of productivity. This result follows from the fact that the surge in the …nancing cost of working capital when default occurs makes it optimal for …rms switch to domestic inputs, which are imperfect substitutes for foreign inputs, causing an e¢ ciency loss. In turn, this e¢ ciency loss is larger at higher levels of TFP because of the strong convexity of marginal products with Cobb-Douglas production. This endogenous increasing output cost of default is consistent with the shape of exogenous output costs that Arellano (2008) identi…ed as useful in order to induce default incentives that trigger default in bad states of nature, at non-negligible debt ratios and at realistic default frequencies. In our model, however, the endogenous feedback between production and default produces a mean debt ratio four times larger than in Arellano's endowment economy model.
Our results also show that the model embodies a powerful …nancial ampli…cation mechanism that can explain the seemingly large contribution of productivity shocks to output collapses during …nancial crises. In default episodes, this mechanism ampli…es the output e¤ect of TFP shocks by 80 percent. Solow residuals computed in the standard way overestimate the contribution of true TFP to the collapse of output when the economy defaults by about 70 percent.
Three features of the model are critical for the results: imported inputs require working capital, the government diverts the …rms' working capital repayment when it defaults, and default induces an e¢ ciency loss in production. Without the …rst two features, output would not respond to changes in country risk. On the other hand, the model would also fail if we rely "too much" on those two features: If exclusion from world credit markets implies that …rms cannot buy foreign inputs and there are no domestic inputs available, or if the inputs are complements instead of substitutes, the output collapse and the associated cost of default would be unrealistically large (in…nitely large if 100 percent of the cost of imported inputs requires payment in advance). In reality, …rms in emerging economies facing …nancial crisis substitute foreign inputs with high …nancing costs for domestic inputs that can be employed at permissible …nancial terms, and/or look for alternative forms of …nancing using retained earnings or redirecting capital expenditures. The e¢ ciency loss is also critical. Without it the working capital channel would not produce a sharp and sudden drop in output during periods of …nancial turmoil.
Our …ndings suggest that the model we proposed can provide a solution to the disconnect between sovereign debt models (which rely on exogenous output dynamics with particular properties to explain the stylized facts of sovereign debt) and models of emerging markets' business cycles (which assume an exogenous …nancing cost of working capital calibrated to match the interest rate on sovereign debt). We acknowledge, however, that the linkages between sovereign default and private sector borrowers, and the mechanisms by which default induces economy-wide e¢ ciency losses, should be the subject of further research. For instance, introducing elements of political uncertainty, debt maturity, secondary debt markets, dynamic renegotiation, and risk averse lenders, all of which have been shown to add signi…cant elements to the analysis of sovereign default in models with exogenous output dynamics, can be a very 
